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ABSTRACT: In a recent article in this journal, Marc Champagne leveled an argument 
against what Wilfrid Sellars dubbed ‘the Myth of the Given.’ Champagne contends that 
what is given in observation in the form of a sensation must be able to both cause and 
justify propositionally structured beliefs. He argues for this claim by attempting to show 
that one cannot decide which of two equally valid chains of inference is sound without 
appeal to what is given in experience. In this note, I show that while this argument is 
sound, the conclusion he draws is far too strong. Champagne’s argument shows only 
that our empirical beliefs are determined through experience. It does not license the 
stronger claim that, in order for us to have empirical knowledge, bare sensations must 
be able to justify beliefs. 
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Introduction 
In a recent article in this journal, Marc Champagne leveled an argument against 
what, in 1956, Wilfrid Sellars dubbed ‘the Myth of the Given.’1 In attacking 
Sellars’s argument that the Given is a myth, Champagne also attacks a school of 
thought that follows in Sellars’s footsteps most notably represented by Robert 
Brandom and John McDowell.2 Champagne contends that what is given in 
observation in the form of a sensation can, indeed must, both cause and justify 
propositionally structured beliefs. He argues for this claim by attempting to show 
that one cannot decide which of two equally valid chains of inference is sound 
without appeal to what is given in experience. In this note, I show that while this 
                                                                
1 Marc Champagne, “Tracking Inferences Is Not Enough: The Given as Tie-Breaker,” Logos & 
Episteme 7, 2 (2016): 129-135; Wilfrid Sellars, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” in 
Knowledge, Mind, and the Given: Reading Wilfrid Sellars’s “Empiricism and the Philosophy of 
Mind,” eds. Willem A. Devries and Timm Triplett (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 
2000), 205-276. 
2 Chauncey Maher, The Pittsburgh School of Philosophy: Sellars, McDowell, Brandom (London: 
Routledge, 2012). 
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argument is sound, the conclusion he draws is far too strong. Champagne’s 
argument shows only that our empirical beliefs are determined through 
experience, but this is something that no one denies – Sellars, Brandom, and 
McDowell included. His argument does not license the stronger claim that, in 
order for us to have empirical knowledge, bare sensations must be able to justify 
beliefs. 
What is ‘the Given’? 
Let’s start by setting the bar for the success of Champagne’s argument: what would 
it have to show in order to refute the Sellarsian claim that the Given is a myth? To 
answer this, we need to know what Sellars meant in labelling the Given as such. 
His primary concern is with a foundationalist picture of knowledge insofar as it 
takes all knowledge – both of particulars and of general empirical truths – to rest 
on a stratum of cognitive states that are both epistemically independent and 
epistemically efficacious.3 This picture requires that these cognitive states – 
sensations, sensings, knowledge of sense data, seeings – be epistemically 
efficacious for the obvious reason that if they are not, then they cannot pass on 
whatever positive epistemic status they have to any further cognitive states. These 
basic cognitive states must be able to support the edifice of empirical knowledge. 
The picture requires that they be epistemically independent – that they have their 
positive epistemic status independent of their relationship to other cognitive states 
– because, if they were not, they could not serve as true foundations. If they 
presuppose knowledge of other particular matters of fact or general empirical 
truths then they cannot, by themselves, serve as the tribunal against which further 
empirical claims are tested. Cognitive states that are both epistemically 
independent and epistemically efficacious are ‘the Given.’ 
Now, Sellars’s claim is that no cognitive state can have both of these 
characteristics. This is what makes the Given a myth, and a pernicious one at that. 
In order for any cognitive state to be epistemically efficacious, it must be 
propositionally structured. This follows from the nature of inference: only 
propositionally structured contents can stand in inferential relations to one 
another. Knowledge of sense data is ruled out on these grounds.  
Sellars argues further that cognitive states with propositionally structured 
content are not epistemically independent. This argument proceeds by cases, but 
one example should be sufficient to get its flavor. A classic proposal for filling in 
                                                                
3 Sellars, “Empiricism,” sec. VIII; also see Willem deVries, “Wilfrid Sellars,” in The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2016), ed. Edward N. Zalta, sec. 4, <http://plato.stanford.edu/ 
archives/fall2016/entries/sellars/>. 
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the strata of basic empirical beliefs in the foundationalist picture appeals to 
sentences similar in form to “There looks to be a physical object with a red and 
triangular facing surface.”4 Lookings or appearings seem to be just what are needed 
to provide a firm footing for empirical knowledge since (1) the concepts invoked 
in an appearing have a plausible claim to epistemic independence and (2) though 
one can be wrong about what one sees, one cannot be mistaken about how things 
appear to her. This incorrigibility is appealing, but Sellars argues that it is the 
product not of an ability to report on some minimal, objective facts but of 
withholding full endorsement of the propositional content of the claim. “[T]he 
statement ‘X looks green to Jones’ differs from ‘Jones sees that x is green’ in that 
whereas the latter both ascribes a propositional claim to Jones’s experience and 
endorses it, the former ascribes the claim but does not endorse it.”5 This 
undermines (2), but if Sellars is right, then this also entails that the notion of being 
green is not reducible to that of looking green, for “the ability to recognize that x 
looks green presupposes the concept of being green.”6 This means that (1) is also 
called into question since the ability to use the concept of being green presupposes 
knowledge of what circumstances count as standard conditions for observing 
colors and an ability to determine whether those circumstances obtain, which 
presupposes knowledge of a range of other perceptibles besides. Looks talk, though 
epistemically efficacious, is not epistemically independent, and so cannot serve as 
‘the Given.’ 
Champagne’s argument would have to do one of three things in order to 
convince us that the Given is not a myth. (1) He might propose by way of example 
some item that is given in experience that is both epistemically efficacious and 
epistemically independent. This would involve the construction of an entire 
epistemology of perception, but his article is not nearly so ambitious. (2) He might 
show that Sellars’s arguments are somehow badly mistaken. Champagne does ask 
his readers to recall “that philosophers who reject the given do so, not in response 
to some tangible crisis, but on account of a technical let-down: it is not 
propositional, and therefore cannot enter into an argument.”7 This, however, is 
not the main thrust of his argument, and he does not develop the thought in any 
detail. Finally, (3) he might show that it is necessary for something to be given in 
                                                                
4 Sellars, “Empiricism,” sec. 9. 
5 Ibid., sec. 16; Robert B. Brandom, From Empiricism to Expressivism: Brandom Reads Sellars 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015), 105-109; Devries and Triplett, ed., Knowledge, 
Mind, and the Given, chap. 3. 
6 Sellars, “Empiricism,” sec. 19. 
7 Champagne, “Tracking Inferences,” 133-134. 
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experience in order for us to have any empirical knowledge at all. Givenness 
might be the cost of avoiding skepticism. This would be odd since the Cartesian 
desire for firm foundations is at the root of external-world skepticism, but this 
seems to be the course Champagne pursues. He aims to argue that encounter with 
a bare given in experience is necessary for empirical knowledge. Let’s turn now to 
this argument. 
Champagne’s Müller-Lyer Illusion Argument 
We are asked to consider the Müller-Lyer illusion, a simple visual illusion in 
which arrowheads are appended to the ends of two parallel lines of equal length. 
On one line, the arrowheads point inward, on the other outward. To the observer, 
this setup gives the illusion that the line with outward facing arrowheads is longer 
than that with inward facing arrowheads. Champagne asks us to imagine a naïve 
observer sitting in a darkened room. She is unfamiliar with the illusion. It is 
described to her in sufficient detail, and then she is given the following argument: 
1) The Müller-Lyer lines appear uneven  
2) The Müller-Lyer lines are even  
3) Illusions are not as they appear  
Therefore,  
4) The Müller-Lyer lines are an illusion8 
Does the subject know the conclusion of this argument? We are to assume 
that she knows what all the terms mean and that she grasps the inferential 
relations being laid before her. We could also assume that this naïve observer 
grasps many of the other inferences adjacent to this particular sequence. She 
might grasp, for example, that undertaking a commitment to the claim that the 
two lines are uneven would commit her to the further claim that if one were to 
draw perpendicular lines at the ends of the ‘longer’ line, these newly drawn lines 
would pass by the ends of the shorter line without touching it and that 
undertaking a commitment to the claim that the two lines are even would entail 
that, in performing the same operation, the perpendicular lines would make 
contact at both ends of both lines.9 The ability to do this – to draw out inferences 
entailed by a commitment one undertakes – is enough to credit this observer with 
                                                                
8 Ibid., 131. 
9 Ibid., 132. 
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rationality, but none of this entails that she knows the conclusion of the 
argument.10 
Champagne’s point is that this inferential chain remains idle unless one is 
given ‘an observational cause’ to affirm the first premise. “Reasoning alone might 
establish the formal validity of the inference presented in the darkness, but the 
only way for the subject to assess the soundness of the argument is for her to take 
advantage of the experiential deliverances which alone can establish whether the 
first premise is true.”11  
Now, there is a way in which this is already too quick. The soundness of the 
inference could be secured by testimony. If our observer has reason to trust the 
account of the illusion given to her, then she might accept the conclusion on the 
authority of the explainer. Let’s set aside testimony, however, for we must admit 
that though much of our knowledge rests on testimony, the edifice of empirical 
knowledge cannot on the whole. At some point, observation must play a role, and 
this is the point that Champagne is keen to make.  
So, observation is necessary to, as Champagne puts it, break the tie between 
two equally valid chains of inference: a modus ponens establishing the truth of the 
conclusion and one establishing its falsity. Does this show that the Given isn’t a 
myth after all since it is required for empirical cognition? No. This would follow 
only if Sellars, Brandom, and McDowell understood the myth of the Given as an 
argument against the possibility of any perceptual encounters with the world 
licensing claims to knowledge. Sellars’s argument in “Empiricism and the 
Philosophy of Mind” doesn’t do this. Rather, it shows that there is a particular 
shape that such encounters cannot take: they cannot be cognitive states that are 
both epistemically independent and epistemically efficacious. To put this another 
way, it shows that bare encounters with the world cannot provide a rational 
constraint on our thinking without calling into play certain capacities that belong 
to our conceptual apparatus.12 This is far from saying that perceptual encounters 
with the world are impossible or unimportant for empirical knowledge.  
Champagne’s argument shows us only that the deliverances of perceptual 
experience are required in order to break the tie between the two potential chains 
of inference, but he has nothing at all to say about what shape perceptual 
experience must take. He claims only that whether the Müller-Lyer lines are or 
appear even must be “ascertained by looking” and that “claims and inferences are 
                                                                
10 Ibid., 133. 
11 Ibid., 132. 
12 John McDowell, Mind and World (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 66. 
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answerable to the experiential qualities before one.”13 Neither Sellars, Brandom, 
nor McDowell reject the need to ground empirical knowledge in experiential 
encounters with the world; all three, and other Sellarsians besides, agree that we 
require a theory of non-inferential knowledge. They are in accord with 
Champagne on this point. The problem, though, is to develop such a theory 
without falling afoul of the myth. While much of the work of these three authors 
is devoted to just this problem, Champagne ignores it entirely. 
Sellarsians on Perception 
Sellars, for his part, develops a positive epistemology that is part reliablist and part 
internalist.14 He argues first that we must possess dispositions to reliably respond 
differentially to perceptual stimuli. These reliable differential responsive 
dispositions (RDRDs, for Brandom) are something genuine knowers like us share 
with all sentient critters. What separates us from them in terms of epistemic 
abilities is that we have the capacity to reliably differentially respond by applying 
concepts. Our responses are perceptual judgments. Applying concepts (and, so, 
making judgments), for Sellars, is a matter of mastering the use of words, which 
involves the ability to take up a position in the game of giving and asking for 
reasons. In particular, applying concepts in perceptual judgment involves 
undertaking a commitment to the content of that judgment as something that can 
both stand in need of and serve as a reason. It is making oneself liable to give 
reasons for the judgment and committing oneself to its downstream consequences. 
This is where the internalist component comes in, for a reliable responsive 
disposition to differentially apply concepts can count as a judgment only if one 
knows that one’s RDRDs are indeed reliable. It is only if this is the case that one 
could give reasons for the perceptual judgment to which one has undertaken a 
commitment.15 
Brandom develops this Sellarsian position in a social pragmatic direction. 
There is a problem lurking in Sellars’s account: one can have perceptual 
knowledge only if one knows that one’s RDRDs are reliable, but it seems that one 
could only come to know that on the basis of past experiences of their reliability. 
The problem is that those experiences couldn’t have counted as instances of 
                                                                
13 Champagne, “Tracking Inferences,” 133. 
14 Sellars, “Empiricism,” sec. 35. 
15 deVries, “Wilfrid Sellars,” sec. 4; Robert Brandom, Tales of the Mighty Dead: Historical Essays 
in the Metaphysics of Intentionality (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), chap. 12; 
Paul Coates, The Metaphysics of Perception: Wilfrid Sellars, Perceptual Consciousness and 
Critical Realism (Oxford: Taylor & Francis, 2009). 
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perceptual knowledge.16 Brandom’s solution is to argue that the agent herself need 
not make the reliability inference. It is the knowledge attributor who attributes 
reliability to the knower. This is a route adjacent to strong internalism. It 
recognizes that someone must recognize that the reporter is, in fact, reliable, but 
takes that burden off of the reporter herself. Knowledge is not just accidentally, 
but necessarily, a social phenomenon.17 
Finally, there is McDowell. In Mind and World, he characterizes the myth 
of the Given as an episode in the ‘interminable oscillation’ between a picture of 
perception that has no place for receptivity and one in which the recognized need 
for external constraint on empirical thought motivates us to reintroduce the 
Given, i.e., between coherentism and foundationalism.18 Both poles of this 
oscillation are problematic. On the one hand, conceptual thought – the product of 
pure spontaneity – fails to be constrained by contact with the world. We are left 
with a picture of “the operations of spontaneity as a frictionless spinning in the 
void.”19 On the other hand, when we take the Given to provide the needed 
external constraint, we have a picture of pure receptivity in which the conceptual 
capacities of spontaneity are wholly absent. This gives us only the illusion of 
external constraint, for, as Sellars argued, non-conceptual cognitive states cannot 
be epistemically efficacious. McDowell’s response to this oscillation is to argue for 
a middle ground, an understanding of experience as at once passive and drawing 
“into operation the capacities that genuinely belong to spontaneity.”20  
 
                                                                
16 Rebecca Kukla develops an intriguing account of these past experiences being “constitutively 
misremembered” in order to solve this problem. Rebecca Kukla, “Myth, Memory and 
Misrecognition in Sellars’ ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,’” Philosophical Studies: An 
International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 101, 2-3 (2000): 161-211. 
17 Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), chap. 4; Robert Brandom, “Knowledge and the 
Social Articulation of the Space of Reasons,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55, 4 
(1995): 895-908; also see Rebecca Kukla and Mark Lance, “Yo!” and “Lo!”: The Pragmatic 
Topography of the Space of Reasons (Boston: Harvard University Press, 2009), chap. 2. Kukla 
and Lance develop an account of the pragmatics of perception and argue that the Sellarsian 
tradition errs in thinking that observational episodes must be propositionally structured. They 
claim that this follows from too narrow a construal of inference and that, in the end, what is 
required is that they be conceptual. 
18 McDowell, Mind and World, 9. 
19 Ibid., 11. 
20 Ibid., 13. 
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Conclusion 
McDowell’s diagnosis of the oscillation furnishes a lens through which to view 
Champagne’s argument. Champagne understands the rejection of the Given as a 
myth as synonymous with the endorsement of the opposite pole of oscillation, 
namely, coherentism. His worry is that in rejecting the Given we confine thought 
to a frictionless spinning in the void or, perhaps worse, thought becomes 
paralyzed. When faced with equally valid inferences issuing in contradictory 
conclusions, we have no reason for endorsing one over the other without some 
encounter with the world through experience. Champagne’s response is to recoil 
to the other pole. This is precisely the mistake Sellars hoped to warn us against. As 
our excursion into Sellarsian territory has shown, each of Champagne’s targets 
recognizes this demand for external constraint. The myth of the Given is not the 
rejection of experience as a source of knowledge. Recognition of the myth 
requires, however, that we accept certain constraints on how we understand 
experience. It cannot be a bare, non-conceptual encounter with the world if it is 
to be epistemically efficacious.  
Champagne closes by claiming, “Givenness, whatever else it might be, is the 
tie-breaker,” but as I believe I have shown, it is perceptual experience, not the 
Given, that breaks the tie. The problem with which we are faced is how to 
conceive of such experiences without falling afoul of the myth. In the end, 
Champagne is right that tracking inferences is not enough, but neither Sellars nor 
later Sellarsians thought that it was. 
